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Introduction
This statement of tax policy presents the recommendations of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
for improving the Social Security retirement system. These rec­
ommendations are based on the 1980 edition o f Statement o f Tax 
Policy 8, Suggested Improvements fo r  the Social Security Retire­
ment System, prepared by the AICPA Tax Division.
Statements o f tax policy are approved by the Executive Com­
mittee o f the AICPA Federal Tax Division after they are developed 
by the division’s tax policy subcommittee. They represent the views 
of the Institute on key policy issues. The conclusions reached in 
the Statements are based on the conditions existent at the time 
the Statements are issued. The Institute periodically reviews and, 
if necessary, reissues or revises outstanding tax policy statements. 
Given the fact that the economic and legislative environment ex­
isting when a statement is issued can change dramatically in a 
relatively short period o f time, it is possible that the Statement 
may, at a given point in time, no longer represent the views of 
the Institute. Thus, should the need to know the Institute’s current 
position arise, the reader should check with the AICPA Federal 
Tax Division to determine the current status of this Statement.
Summary of 
Recommendations
Since the first edition of Statement o f Tax Policy 8 was issued 
in 1980, there have been several important legislative and admin­
istrative actions that have significantly affected the Social Security
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program. In particular, the President’s National Commission on 
Social Security Reform examined the Social Security system and 
concluded that Congress “ should not alter the fundamental struc­
ture o f the Social Security program or undermine its fundamental 
principles.” 1 Subsequent to the Commission’s report, the Congress 
enacted amendments to the Social Security Act in 1983 that in­
corporated many of the Commission’s recommendations (an ac­
celeration o f legislated future tax increases, increases in the self- 
employment tax, increases in the retirement age, and increases in 
the scope of coverage). Several o f these changes were advocated 
in Statement of Tax Policy 8. However, the 1983 amendments did 
not alter the fundamental premise on which the system was 
founded.
The AICPA maintains that a change in philosophy in the Social 
Security program is necessary if the program is to remain viable 
and continue to receive public support in the long run. The need 
for such a change will be particularly acute as the Social Security 
program enters into the twenty-first century. During the early part 
o f that century, the number o f beneficiaries will increase dramat­
ically in relation to the number o f workers who must bear the 
burden of funding retirement benefits. Without any changes in 
the system, it is projected that the Social Security system will once 
again begin incurring substantial deficits during this period.2 To 
sustain the current benefit payout structure, it will be necessary 
to raise payroll taxes, perhaps by as much as 10 percentage points 
over the scheduled rates.
Because payroll taxes cannot continue to rise at this rate, these 
recommendations focus on the benefits taxpayers should receive 
from the system. If adopted, these recommendations could prevent 
long-term operating deficits for the retirement portion o f the Social 
Security system and could allow for some reduction in Social Se­
curity taxes. In addition, these proposals would significantly sim­
plify the system and make it more equitable.
The recommendations of the AICPA are as follows:
1. The present three-tiered benefit structure that weights benefits
in favor o f low-wage earners should be replaced by a level ben­
efit structure in which benefits are directly related to each work-
1. Report of the National Commission on Social Security Reform (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 2-2.
2. For a summary of the projected financial status o f the Social Security trust 
funds, see chapter 1, “Overview of the Social Security System.”
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2.
er’s contributions to the retirement system,3 An individual’s 
total contributions would include the retirement portion o f both 
the employee- and employer-paid contributions, increased by 
an earnings factor that includes a real rate o f return. This amount 
would be the basis for the earned retirement benefit. To receive 
the same retirement annuities, self-employed persons should 
contribute an amount equal to the total amount contributed by 
both the employee and the employer.
The present system generally pays out retirement benefits in 
excess o f the amounts that would be received on the basis o f 
an individual’s total contributions to the system. These excess 
benefits in effect constitute welfare-type payments.4 Such ex­
cess benefits should be subjected to a needs test and funded 
by federal general revenues, but should not be part o f the Social 
Security system.
Under this benefit proposal, the amounts paid out o f the Social 
Security program to persons currently receiving benefits in ex­
cess o f an actuarially determined amount (primarily low- and 
middle-wage earners and single-wage earner couples) would be 
reduced. However, the total benefits received by these persons 
would not be reduced because the “needs” portion o f the re­
tirement benefit would be shifted to the Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) program and funded by general revenues. In ad­
dition, for present and near-term retirees, the current level o f 
scheduled benefits should be guaranteed without tests o f need, 
but the excess o f the amounts that they receive over the amounts 
that they would collect under the earned computation plan 
should come from the SSI program.
Settlement options selected at the time o f retirement should 
include (a) a joint-and-survivor annuity (for married couples), 
(b) a single-life annuity, or (c) an annuity with a guaranteed 
refund feature under which the total retirement contributions 
(increased by an earnings factor that reflects a real rate o f return) 
would be guaranteed to either the retiree or the estate. Each 
individual’s contributions would determine the eventual retire-
3. For a more complete explanation o f how benefits are calculated under the 
current Social Security program, see chapter 1 and the Appendix.
4. For a delineation o f the “earned” from the “windfa ll” benefits under the 
current Social Security program, see the analysis in chapter 2, “An Annuity 
Analysis o f the Current Social Security Benefit Program.”
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merit benefits. In the event o f death prior to retirement, the 
contributions credits or a lump sum distribution would become 
part o f the estate and could be passed to a surviving spouse or 
other legatee. Where both spouses are alive at the retirement 
of one (or both) marriage partner(s), it would be desirable for 
the joint-and-survivor election to be mandatory. This would 
protect a surviving spouse who has no contributions record of 
his or her own from having all Social Security benefits ended 
by the death of the other spouse. There could be provisions 
made for a couple to elect out o f the mandatory joint-and-sur- 
vivor election if both spouses have earnings records in their 
own right.
This recommendation would eliminate much of the inequity 
arising under the present system (a) when persons are taxed 
and die before retirement age without having eligible depen­
dents and (b) when one spouse dies after both have contributed 
to the system during working years. It would also eliminate the 
bias that currently exists against single persons and many two- 
wage-earner couples.5
3. The current concept o f funding the Social Security retirement 
system should be retained. Presently, contributions paid in by 
workers and their employers are used to pay benefits to current 
retirees (this is often referred to as the “pay-as-you-go” concept). 
A trust fund exists to serve as a contingency fund in case there 
is an imbalance between contributions received and benefits 
paid out. Ideally, such a fund should be able to provide a cushion 
of between six and nine months o f benefit payments. If the 
Social Security program was “fully funded,” the benefit fund 
would be so enormous that it could have a significant effect on 
the capital and bond markets. Retention o f the “pay-as-you-go” 
concept will leave the trust funds vulnerable to dramatic shifts 
in demographic conditions (especially the ratio o f current work­
ers to retirees). However, the shifting o f the welfare burden 
from the Social Security trust funds to federal general revenues 
will lessen the tax burden on future generations o f workers. 
Short-term imbalances may still arise, in which case interfund 
borrowing or transfers from the general fund may be necessary 
to keep the funds in actuarial balance.
5. For a more complete discussion of the bias that exists in the current program 
toward single workers and two-earner couples, see chapter 1 and the analysis in 
chapter 2.
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4. The retirement annuity should begin at what society determines 
to be an appropriate “normal retirement age” (e.g., age 65), 
unless actuarially reduced benefits beginning at some earlier 
age have been elected, regardless o f the participant’s employ­
ment status. If early retirement is permitted, the initial annuity 
should be based on contributions up to that retirement date. 
Wages after early retirement should be subject to Social Se­
curity taxation until normal retirement age, thus requiring an 
annual recomputation of the retirement annuity.
Discontinuing the Social Security taxation on earnings after nor­
mal retirement age is reached would eliminate all inequities in 
the present rules concerning work after that age. Many persons 
have difficulty explaining why individuals who need income 
should be penalized (i.e., subjected to Social Security taxation 
and loss o f Social Security benefits) for working, whereas per­
sons with large amounts o f investment income (and thus large 
equity interests) collect full Social Security benefits.6
5. For income tax purposes, the retirement portion o f the Social 
Security tax assessed against employees and self-employed per­
sons should be deductible when it is paid (preferably as a de­
duction in computing adjusted gross income), and retirement 
benefits should be fully taxable when they are received. The 
employer’s contribution should continue to be deductible by 
the employer. Because lump-sum distributions (the result 
either o f death before retirement age or o f the guaranteed re­
fund feature) would be subject to income tax, Congress should 
consider some form of income averaging. A phase-in period 
should be allowed to prevent taxation o f benefits resulting from 
past contributions that were not deductible. Allowing for the 
deductibility o f the employee’s portion o f the Social Security 
tax would result in a significant reduction in federal income tax 
receipts (perhaps as much as $30 billion under 1985 rates). This 
would be partially off set when Social Security benefits become 
fully taxable.
6. Coverage under Social Security should be mandatory for all 
workers. Exceptions should continue to exist for short-term 
nonresident alien workers.
7. The concept o f earnings sharing should be explored as one 
means by which the contributions records o f each spouse would
6. The mechanics of the “ retirement test” are more fully explained in chapter 1.
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be determined. Under a pure form o f earnings sharing, the 
contributions o f each spouse would be combined and divided 
equally during the period o f marriage. Each spouse would have 
a separate earnings record and could make the decision to retire 
independently o f the other spouse. Earnings sharing would also 
alleviate the inequity that results under the current system 
when one spouse spends a significant period o f time out o f 
covered employment (e.g., to care for children) and does not 
qualify for benefits based on the other spouse’s earnings record 
(e.g., the marriage lasted less than ten years). Despite the sim­
plicity o f the concept o f earnings sharing, implementation of 
such a system would be complex and would probably need to 
be phased in over a number o f years.7 An alternative to earnings 
sharing would be to treat an individual’s contributions record 
as a property interest that would be subject to division in any 
settlement resulting from the dissolution o f a marriage.
Maintaining the Safety Net
The foregoing recommendations are directed at improving the 
nation’s mandatory retirement system. The major thrust o f these 
recommendations is that welfare, the actuarially unearned portion 
o f the benefits from the Social Security system, should be trans­
ferred to the general revenues budget and subjected to a needs 
test. Welfare should be an expenditure out o f general revenues, 
not payroll tax revenues. To protect low-income retirees from fall­
ing below a pre-determined minimum level o f income protection, 
it is recommended that the following additional goals be adopted 
in conjunction with the suggested changes to the Social Security 
program:
1. The Social Security program should be viewed as one part o f a 
broader national retirement income program, the other two 
parts being private savings and employment-related pension 
programs. The role o f Social Security should be to provide a 
basic floor o f protection for every worker who has spent a sub­
stantial portion o f his or her working life under the Social Se-
7. For an in-depth analysis of earnings sharing plans and the resulting imple­
mentation problems, see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Re­
port on Earnings Sharing Implementation Study (SSA Pub. No. 12-004, January 
1985).
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curity program and earned at least the average covered wage, 
but not to provide the sole means o f retirement support. In 
cases where Social Security, other pension benefits, and savings   
fail to provide a determined minimum level o f income, the fu nds 
needed to bring an individual to such an income level should 
come from a program such as the Supplemental Security Income 
program. Use o f the SSI program to fund income transfer pay­
ments is more equitable because it is means-tested and is part 
o f the general revenues budget.
2. Congress should continue to provide initiatives for private sav­
ings and mandate more uniform pension laws to promote pen­
sion equity. However, a goal o f providing a level o f retirement 
income that will enable all individuals to maintain their pre­
retirement standard o f living should not be a part o f a national 
income policy. The legislation of any mandated universal pen­
sion plan (such as the Minimum Universal Pension System, or 
MUPS, recommended by the President’s Commission on Pen­
sion Policy in 1981) should not be enacted.8 The government 
should take actions to encourage people to plan for their income 
needs at retirement, but it seems inappropriate for the federal 
government to require everyone to forgo current consumption 
in favor o f a specified level o f retirement benefits.
3. There should be a federally funded study to establish a valid 
minimum income level for retired persons and to examine the 
economic implications of these recommendations. Retirees have 
much different income needs than persons who are working or 
who have families to support or both. Any minimum income 
level needs to take such considerations into account if it is to 
be valid.
Implications of Adopting These 
Recommendations
The shift o f welfare payments from the Social Security program 
could permit a reduction, or at least prevent an increase, in Social 
Security taxes. However, the need for general revenue (primarily
8. This plan was advocated by the President’s Commission on Pension Policy in 
its report, Coming of Age: Toward a National Retirement Income Policy (Wash­
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 41.
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from the income tax) could increase. The tax reduction for Social 
Security could exceed the needed additional income tax revenue 
because of the implementation of the means test under the SSI 
program. The entire Social Security tax reduction should result in 
reduced labor costs (especially to labor-intensive small businesses) 
and increased economic activity, which, in turn, could help reduce 
unemployment, lower inflation, and increase capital formation.
The recommendations set forth in this Tax Policy Statement 
should be viewed as an integrated plan for change in the Social 
Security program. Although certain o f the recommendations could 
be implemented without adopting the entire set o f recommenda­
tions (e.g., recommendations 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 could be enacted 
individually without adopting recommendations 1 and 2), the 
AICPA believes that the recommendations should be considered 
together and not piecemeal.
Adoption of these recommendations would represent a radical 
departure from the premise on which the Social Security system 
has operated almost since its inception. In particular, the emphasis 
under this proposal is on the principle o f individual equity as the 
primary goal o f the Social Security program. Individual equity is 
achieved when each person’s Social Security benefits are actuarially 
based on that person’s lifetime contributions. Currently, the pri­
mary emphasis o f the Social Security program is on “ social ade­
quacy,” which has been defined as a “welfare objective."9
It is highly likely that benefits paid out o f the Social Security 
program would be reduced to many beneficiaries as a result o f 
adopting an annuity approach (total benefits to low-income persons 
would not necessarily be reduced, however, because o f the SSI 
supplement). Such benefit reductions could be cause for political 
concern. However, there is no room left in the Social Security 
program for political measures that lack fiscal intregrity. Difficult 
decisions will have to be made now if future workers can be ex­
pected to continue to support the system. Such support is essential 
to future beneficiaries, who are dependent on the payments made 
by the current workers o f that period. The time for debate on long- 
range issues is now, while the Social Security program is expected 
to experience a period of solvency. If debate is postponed until 
another crisis, the solutions will once again be based on expediency 
and not on reasoned debate.
9. For a discussion of the objectives of “ social adequacy” and “individual equity” 
in the Social Security program, see chapter 1.
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TAX POLICY ANALYSIS
1
Overview of the Social 
Security System
A Basic Description of the Program
The Social Security system is composed o f four distinct pro­
grams. The objective o f three o f these programs (the old-age, sur­
vivors, and disability programs) is to replace part o f the earnings 
lost to a family due to the retirement, death, or disability o f a wage 
earner in the family. The fourth program (the hospital program) is 
designed to provide health care for the elderly. Each o f these four 
programs will be briefly described in this section.
Old-age Insurance (OAI) Program
The old-age insurance program is the largest and most visible 
o f the four Social Security programs. It is responsible for providing 
monthly cash retirement benefits to qualifying beneficiaries and 
their dependents. In fiscal year 1985 this program paid 25.9 million 
beneficiaries more than $127 billion in retirement benefits.1 Re­
tired workers averaged approximately $5,150 per year in benefits, 
while their spouse beneficiaries averaged approximately $3,400 per 
year.
1. 1986 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees o f the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds (Washington, D .C.: U.S. Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1986), pp. 21, 89.
9
A person qualifies for retirement benefits in one o f two ways, 
either as an “ insured worker” or as a member o f an insured worker’s 
family. There are five levels o f insured status, and the level attained 
by the worker aff ects not only the availability o f retirement benefits, 
but also survivorship, disability, and hospital benefits.
A worker may first apply for retirement benefits upon reaching 
age 62 only if the worker is “fully insured. ” The determination o f 
fully insured status is made by totaling a worker’s “quarters o f 
coverage. ” A quarter o f coverage is measured by a prescribed dollar 
amount o f annual wages or self-employment income that has been 
subject to the Social Security tax. For 1986, employees and self- 
employed persons receive one quarter o f coverage for each $440 
o f covered annual wages, up to a maximum of four quarters per 
year (i.e., a worker who has $1,760 of covered wages or self-em­
ployment income in 1986 receives credit for four quarters o f cov­
erage). The amount o f covered wages that represents a quarter o f 
coverage is indexed annually by multiplying the ratio o f the average 
annual covered wage from the second preceding year (for 1986, 
the numerator would be the average covered wage from 1984) over 
the average annual covered wage from 1976 times $250. This 
amount is rounded to the nearest multiple o f ten. For a person 
reaching age 62 in 1986, the minimum number o f quarters nec­
essary to qualify for retirement benefits is thirty-five. This will 
increase to thirty-six quarters in 1987 and forty quarters in 1991.
Certain dependents o f a fully insured retired worker may also 
qualify for benefits based on the worker’s earnings record. These 
dependents may be summarized as—
1. A spouse, age 62 or older.
2. An unmarried child under age 18 (age 19 if still in high school).
3. A disabled unmarried child.
4. A spouse under 62 if he or she is caring for the retired worker’s 
child who is under age 16 or disabled, provided the child is 
receiving a benefit based on the retired worker’s earnings re­
cord.
5. A divorced spouse age 62 or older may also qualify for benefits 
based on an ex-spouse’s earnings record if the marriage lasted 
for ten years or more.
The computation o f the monthly retirement benefit will be 
discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.
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Survivorship Insurance (SI) Program
The survivorship insurance program is responsible for providing 
benefits to qualifying dependents o f a deceased worker who was 
“currently insured” at the time o f death. The survivorship program 
is the second largest o f the four programs in terms o f dollar outlay, 
paying $38 billion to more than 7.2 million beneficiaries in fiscal 
year 1985.2 Benefits to surviving spouses averaged approximately 
$5,840 per year in 1984.
Survivorship benefits are restricted to those dependents o f cur­
rently insured workers. The number o f quarters o f coverage nec­
essary to be considered currently insured increases as a worker 
grows older. Regardless of age, a worker will be considered cur­
rently insured if he or she has at least six quarters o f coverage 
during the thirteen-quarter period ending with the calendar 
quarter in which death occurred.
Dependents who may qualify for survivorship benefits can be 
summarized as—
1. A spouse, age 60 or older.
2. An unmarried child under age 18.
3. A disabled unmarried child.
4. A spouse or divorced spouse who is caring for the worker’s child 
who is under age 16 or disabled, provided the child is receiving 
a benefit based on the deceased worker’s earnings record.
5. A spouse, age 50 or older, who becomes disabled within seven 
years after the worker’s death.
6. A worker’s dependent parents age 62 or older.
7. A divorced spouse may qualify for benefits if the marriage lasted 
for at least ten years.
Disability Insurance (Dl) Program
The disability insurance program is responsible for providing 
benefits to currently disabled workers who have “disability in­
sured” status and to qualifying dependents o f the worker. The 
disability insurance program is the smallest o f the four programs, 
paying out $18.7 billion to 3.9 million beneficiaries during fiscal
2. 1986 Annual Report, pp. 21, 89.
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year 1985.3 Disabled workers received an average benefit o f ap­
proximately $6,145 per year in 1985.
A worker qualifies for disability payments if that worker is “ dis­
ability insured. ” Disability insured status is attained if the worker 
has at least twenty quarters o f coverage during the forty-quarter 
period ending with the quarter in which the disability occurred. 
Special provisions exist for younger workers. In all cases, the dis­
ability must be such that it prevents gainful employment, and such 
disability is expected to last for at least twelve months or result in 
death.
Disability payments are available to a disabled worker up to 
the age of 65 and to the same set o f dependents who are eligible 
for a worker’s retirement benefits.
Hospital Insurance (HI) Program
The hospital insurance program, which is one part o f Medicare, 
is responsible for subsidizing much o f the cost o f health care for 
persons age 65 and over. Medicare is composed o f two parts, hos­
pital insurance (Part A) and supplementary medical insurance (Part 
B). Part A covers inpatient hospital care, while Part B covers doc­
tors’ services, outpatient hospital care, and medical supplies. Part 
B is part o f the Social Security system even though it is not financed 
by any part o f the payroll tax. The hospital insurance program paid 
out $47.6 billion to approximately 27 million beneficiaries during 
fiscal year 1985.4
Financing the Social Security Program
The dollars needed to finance the Social Security programs are 
raised through the imposition of a tax on the wages o f employees 
in “covered employment” and on net income derived from self- 
employment. These dollars are allocated among three trust funds, 
the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, the Dis­
ability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, and the Hospital Insurance (HI)
3. 1986 Annual Report, pp. 26, 92.
4. 1986 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance 
Trust Fund (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 2.
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Trust Fund. The trust fund reserves are invested in interest-bear­
ing obligations of the U.S. government or in exclusively issued 
public debt obligations. The average interest rate earned by these 
funds in fiscal year 1985 was 12.4 percent.5
Despite the existence of trust funds for each Social Security 
program, it is important to recognize that the Social Security sys­
tem is not actuarially funded. Instead, the system operates on a 
“pay-as-you-go” basis, with the funds currently received being used 
to finance the current benefits. This method of operation, also 
referred to as “current cost” financing, attempts to match current 
year revenues with current year expenditures. The trust funds 
serve as contingency reserves to guard against fluctuations due to 
unforeseen changes in economic conditions.
The “pay-as-you-go” approach to financing the Social Security 
programs creates unique inter-generational compacts between cur­
rent beneficiaries, current workers, and future generations o f work­
ers. In the absence o f any funded retirement system, the tax rate 
borne by current workers becomes a function not o f their future 
retirement benefits, but rather it is determined by the level o f 
current retirement benefits. Current workers must then rely on 
future workers to continue to support the retirement system when 
they retire.
Who Is Taxed
Although Social Security payments are often characterized as 
“contributions,” participation in the Social Security program is, for 
the most part, mandatory for both employers and employees and 
self-employed persons. More than 90 percent o f the current work­
force (122 million workers in fiscal year 1985) is covered under the 
Social Security program. Prior to the 1983 Amendments to the 
Social Security Act, the following groups o f workers were exempt 
from participation in the program:
1. Federal civilian employees covered under another U.S. retire­
ment system
2. Employees o f state and municipal governments that were not 
covered by a federal-state agreement or that elected to withdraw 
from the program
5. 1986 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 23.
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3. Employees o f certain nonprofit organizations that had not ar­
ranged for Social Security coverage
The 1983 Amendments extended coverage on a mandatory basis 
to newly hired federal employees and current and future employees 
o f nonprofit organizations. In addition, the amendments prohibited 
state and local governments from electing out o f the system after 
April 20, 1983.
What Is Taxed
The Social Security tax is a payroll tax, applied only to the 
“covered” wages o f employees and the net employment income of 
self-employed persons. Passive sources o f income such as invest­
ment income, rents, and capital gains are not subject to the Social 
Security tax. The maximum amount o f total wages and net self- 
employment income that is subject to tax is defined as the “con­
tribution and benefit base.” For 1986, this ceiling is set at $42,000. 
This amount is indexed each year by the ratio o f the average cov­
ered wage from the second preceding year over the average cov­
ered wage from the third preceding year (for 1986, the index was 
the 1984 average covered wage [$16,135.07] divided by the 1983 
average covered wage [$15,239.24] times the 1985 contribution 
and benefit base [$39,600]). The resulting number is rounded to 
the nearest multiple o f $300. For 1987, the contribution and benefit 
base is scheduled to increase to $43,800.
How Much Is Taxed
The Social Security tax itself is a flat rate that is applied to 
covered earnings up to the contribution and benefit base. Em­
ployers and employees split the flat rate evenly, while self-em­
ployed persons are subject to the entire rate. Prior to the 1983 
Amendments to the Social Security Act, self-employed persons 
paid a rate that was approximately two-thirds the combined em­
ployer-employee rate. Under a transition provision, self-employed 
persons will receive a credit against their federal income tax o f 2.7 
percent times covered wages in 1984, 2.3 percent in 1985, and 2.0 
percent in 1986 to 1989. Beginning in 1990, self-employed persons 
will be allowed a deduction against their federal taxable income of 
one-half o f their total Social Security tax paid. For 1984 only, em­
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ployees (but not employers) also received a credit against their 
federal income tax of 0.3 percent o f covered wages. Employees are 
not permitted to deduct any o f their Social Security taxes against 
their taxable income.
The total Social Security tax rate levied in 1987 is 7.15 percent 
each for employers and employees and 14.3 percent for self-em­
ployed persons. The combined employer-employee rate is allo­
cated to the three trust funds in the following manner in 1987:
OASI
DI
HI
10.4%
1 .0%
2.9%
Under current law, the combined rate is scheduled to increase 
to 15.02 percent in 1988, with additional increases scheduled to 
take effect in 1990 and 2000, reaching a maximum combined rate 
o f 15.3 percent (7.65 percent each for employers and employees). 
These rates are subject to change if economic conditions precipitate 
a shortfall or surplus in the trust funds.
Computing Social Security 
Benefit Amounts
A worker’s initial monthly retirement or disability benefit is 
based on the worker’s “primary insurance amount” (PIA). The PIA 
becomes the base from which almost all o f the cash benefits are 
computed, including dependent and survivorship benefits.
There are currently five basic types o f PIA computation meth­
ods. They are: (1) PIA table method, (2) wage-indexed formula 
method, (3) transitional guarantee method, (4) old-start method, 
and (5) special minimum method. The wage-indexed formula 
method will apply to the vast majority o f workers who reach age 
62 after 1978 or become disabled before reaching age 62. The 
mechanics o f this method will be briefly summarized in this section.
Wage-indexed Formula Method
The wage-indexed formula method was introduced in the 1977 
Amendments to the Social Security Act to apply to beneficiaries
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reaching age 62 after 1978. The objective o f this method is to index 
a retiree’s past covered earnings to reflect increases in the average 
covered wages of all workers over the worker’s period o f employ­
ment. Under this formula, a worker’s actual covered wages for each 
year up to and including the second year before the year in which 
the worker turns 62, dies, or becomes disabled are indexed by 
multiplying the actual covered wage times the following ratio:
Average covered annual wage in the second year 
________ prior to age 62, death, or disability________
Average covered annual wage in the year indexed
Those wages not indexed are included in the formula at their actual 
amounts.
The computation period used in the formula consists o f the 
years beginning after 1950 or age 21 (whichever is later) and ex­
tending up to the year in which the worker becomes 62, dies, or 
becomes disabled (whichever is earliest). The five years o f lowest 
indexed earnings are dropped, and years o f earnings beginning 
with age 62 are substituted for years o f lower indexed earnings 
included in the computation period.
The remaining indexed and actual wages in the computation 
period are summed and divided by the number of months in the 
computation period to produce an “average indexed monthly earn­
ing” (AIME). The AIME becomes the basis for the computation 
o f the worker’s PIA.
The PIA is computed by applying three separate percentage 
rates to portions o f the AIME. The dollar amounts o f AIME at 
which the percentage rate changes are referred to as “bend points. ” 
As originally enacted for 1979, the PIA percentage rates and bend 
points were:
90%  X first $180 of A IM E , plus
32%  X A IM E  over $180 and through $1085, plus
15% X AIM E  over $1085.
The bend points are indexed each year by multiplying the bend 
point times the ratio o f the average annual covered wage for the 
second preceding year over the average annual covered wage for 
1977. The bend points for 1986 are as follows:
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90%  X first $297 of A IM E , plus
32%  X A IM E  over $297 and through $1790, plus
15% X A IM E  over $1790.
The amount computed using this formula is rounded to the next 
lower multiple o f $0.10. A complete example o f the operation of 
this formula is presented in the Appendix. It should be emphasized 
that the benefit received is strictly a function o f covered wages. 
At no time does the actual amount o f tax paid enter into the com­
putation.
Once the PIA is computed, future benefits are automatically 
increased (subject to Congressional approval) to reflect changes in 
the cost o f living index (CPI). If the CPI monthly average for the 
third quarter o f the current year is at least 3 percent higher than 
in the third quarter o f the preceding year, the monthly benefit is 
increased by the increase in the CPI, effective in January o f the 
next year. Should the CPI increase not exceed 3 percent, Congress 
may still authorize an increase in Social Security benefits if it 
chooses to do so (as it did in 1987).
Adjustments to the Monthly Benefit
There are three major adjustments that can affect the amount 
of monthly benefit actually received. These adjustments may be 
classified as (1) an actuarial reduction or increase to the PIA, (2) 
CPI increases, and (3) a retirement test reduction.
The actuarial reduction or increase factor is applied to the PIA 
if a worker retires prior to “normal retirement age” (age 65 in 1985) 
or continues working beyond normal retirement age. In 1985, a 
worker may apply for retirement benefits as early as age 62, but 
such benefits are reduced by five-ninths o f 1 percent for each 
retirement month prior to age 65. For a person retiring at age 62 
in 1985, the retirement benefit will be 80 percent o f the PIA. The 
amount of the reduction is scheduled to increase as the normal 
retirement age is raised. By the year 2005, the normal retirement 
age will be age 66 and the reduced benefit for retiring at age 62 
will drop to 75 percent o f the PIA. By the year 2022, the normal 
retirement age will be age 67 and the reduced benefit for retiring 
at age 62 will drop to 70 percent o f the PIA. Conversely, if a worker
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continues working beyond age 65 in 1985, the monthly benefit is 
increased by one-fourth of 1 percent for each month worked beyond 
age 65 (or 3 percent per full year). In conjunction with the sched­
uled increases in normal retirement age, the actuarial increase 
factor is also scheduled to be increased for working beyond the 
normal retirement age, reaching a maximum of 8 percent per year 
by 2009.
In addition to the automatic CPI adjustment applied to the 
monthly benefit after entitlement, the initial PIA is increased by 
the CPI fa ctor for each year beginning with age 62 up to the last 
year o f earnings. This is to compensate for the fact that such years 
are not indexed in the PIA computation formula.
A final adjustment to the initial monthly benefit or to subse­
quent monthly benefits is the decrease in benefits due to covered 
wages or self-employment income earned during the retirement 
year. This ‘‘retirement test” applies to only those persons under 
age 70. Persons who reach age 70 may earn an unlimited amount 
o f covered wages or self-employment income and still collect their 
fu ll Social Security retirement benefit. For persons between ages 
65 through 69 during 1986, retirees are permitted to earn $650 
per month ($7,800 per year) without suff ering any loss o f benefits. 
For each dollar earned above this amount, the retirement benefit 
is reduced by $0.50. This amount drops to $0.333 starting in 1990. 
The exempt amount for beneficiaries under age 65 during 1986 is 
$480 per month ($5,760 per year). It is important to note that only 
covered wages and self-employment income are subject to the 
retirement test. A retiree of any age may earn an unlimited amount 
o f investment income during the retirement period without loss o f 
Social Security benefits. The retirement test has been defended 
on the grounds that the Social Security program is designed to 
replace lost earnings, not to augment current earnings.6
Computing Benefits for Dependents of the Worker
The worker’s PIA becomes the base from which the retirement, 
survivorship, and disability benefits o f qualifying members o f the
6. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Martha Derthick, Policymaking 
for Social Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 226.
1 8
worker s family are computed. Qualifying spouses and dependents 
are generally entitled to one-half o f the worker s PIA, except that 
the total amount received by the worker and his or her family is 
limited to a “maximum family benefit”  (MFB). The MFB is com­
puted by applying four separate percentage rates to the worker s 
PIA. The MFB percentage rates and the PIA bend points for 1986 
are as follows:
150% X first $379 of the PIA, plus 
272% X the PIA over $379 and through $548; plus 
134% X the PIA over $548 and through $714; plus 
175% X the PIA over $714.
The resulting sum is rounded to the next lower multiple o f $0.10.
If the worker dies before or during retirement, a qualifying 
spouse is entitled to 100 percent o f the worker’s PIA and qualifying 
children are eligible for 75 percent o f the PIA, up to the MFB. 
For a retired married couple in which one spouse is collecting 
benefits based on the PIA o f the other spouse, the total benefits 
received are analogous to a joint and two-thirds survivor annuity 
(the total benefit received by the surviving spouse drops from 150 
percent o f the PIA to 100 percent o f the PIA after the death of 
one o f the spouses).
In the case o f a worker who dies before receiving any benefits, 
the worker’s surviving spouse is entitled to a lump sum death 
benefit o f not more than $255 in addition to survivorship benefits 
when he or she qualifies. For a married couple in which both 
spouses are entitl ed to a retirement benefit based on their indi­
vidual earnings records or for unmarried workers, the earnings 
credits earned by the deceased worker are nontransferable and no 
part o f any past “premiums” (taxes) paid are refunded to the de­
ceased worker’s estate.
Income Tax Status of Social Security Benefits
Beginning in 1984, up to one-half o f the Social Security benefits 
received by an individual or married couple may be subject to 
taxation as gross income (section 86 o f the Internal Revenue Code 
o f 1954). The following formula is used to determine if such benefits 
are taxable;
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Adjusted gross income (AGI)
+  Tax-exempt interest income 
-I- 1/2 of Social Security benefits received 
Total
— Base amount ($25,000 if single, $32,000 if married filing jointly) 
Difference
X 1/2
Taxable benefit (not to exceed one-half of the benefits received)
Prior to 1984, the entire amount o f Social Security benefits 
received was exempt from federal income taxation under a series 
o f Internal Revenue Service rulings issued in 1938 and 1941.
The Philosophical Foundation of the 
Social Security Program
The principle that a tax system should result in equitable treat­
ment of its taxpayers has traditionally been a standard by which 
tax systems are developed and evaluated. In the most frequent 
case, “ equity” is measured on a relative basis. Do “ equally situated” 
taxpayers pay the same amount of taxes (horizontal equity)? Do 
“unequally situated” taxpayers pay different amounts o f taxes (ver­
tical equity)? The emphasis in the definition o f “equity” is on the 
relative amount o f taxes paid, with little or no consideration given 
to the relative amount o f benefits received in exchange for the 
payments. This is a reasonable approach in light o f the difficulty 
that exists in determining and measuring the value (or utility) of 
each person’s “public goods” received (e.g., highways, national 
defense) in exchange for taxes paid.
The Social Security tax is unique from our other tax systems 
in that the direct benefits to be received as a result o f paying the 
tax can be defined and measured in monetary terms. In fact, some 
have argued that Social Security payments are not “ taxes” in the 
purest sense because there exists a direct measure between taxes 
paid and benefits received. Such persons would prefer to view the 
Social Security “ taxes” as “contributions.”7 The compulsory nature
7. See, for example, Wilbur J. Cohen and Milton Friedman, Social Security: 
Universal or Selective (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1972) and Robert M. Ball, Social Security Today and 
Tomorrow (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 7-9.
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of these payments and the lack o f any contractual guarantee (other 
than moral) o f benefits reduces the validity o f this argument con­
siderably.
This expansion o f the equity concept from a relative to an ab­
solute measure in evaluating the Social Security program would 
be appropriate if the sole purpose o f the Social Security program 
was to function as a retirement annuity program, where each per­
son’s benefits were directly related to contributions made. Al­
though many participants probably think o f the program as such, 
it is more accurate to view Social Security as designed to provide 
economic security to those workers and their dependents who have 
lost their source o f wages because of retirement, disability, or 
death. Social Security, as it presently functions, can better be 
described as “ social insurance,” with the distinction being that the 
program emphasizes the imputed need o f the beneficiary over 
individual actuarial equity, the latter being measured on a quid 
pro quo basis.
Social Adequacy Goals of the Social Security Program
The program goal o f emphasizing imputed need over strict 
actuarial equity is most often referred to as the principle o f “ social 
adequacy.” Social adequacy has been defined as
a welfare objective in which an individual’s benefit amount is deter­
mined, not by his or her contributions, but by (a) appropriate transfer 
of income from affluent to needy groups, and (b) a minimum standard 
of living beneath which society decides that no individual shall fall.8
While this definition o f social adequacy may be correct in prin­
ciple, it fails to mention that under the current Social Security 
provisions, there is no means test applied to the recipients o f ben­
efits. It is possible that an “affluent” person (as measured by total 
wealth) could collect the same benefit as a “ needy” person and 
have paid in the same number of dollars in tax. It is also more 
accurate to say that the transfer o f income does not necessarily 
come from the “affluent,” whose income may be largely exempt 
from the Social Security tax (e.g., interest, dividends, capital gains, 
rents), but rather from the middle- and low-wage earner, the single 
worker, or the two-wage-earner couple.
8. Report o f the Consultant Panel on Social Security to the Congressional 
Research Service (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976),
p. 12.
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If social adequacy was the sole objective o f the program, there 
would be little concern for the correlation between taxes paid and 
benefits received. It could then be argued that such welfare ob­
jectives should more properly be funded by general revenues and 
not a payroll tax. Such is not the case, however. While policymakers 
admit that social adequacy is the primary objective o f the program, 
they also have recognized that individual (actuarial) equity is im­
portant if the program is to continue to receive public support in 
the future. The 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security recog­
nized the importance of retaining some relationship between ben­
efits and taxes when it stated that “all current and future workers 
should be able to expect that Social Security benefits generated 
by increased earnings will provide a reasonable return on the in­
creased employee tax payments on those earnings.”9
Striking an acceptable balance between social adequacy and 
individual equity is a difficult task because the two objectives are 
mutually exclusive. Provisions that promote the objective o f social 
adequacy do so at the expense o f individual equity. In addition, 
the fact that Social Security is not a funded plan requires that equity 
be considered from both an intragenerational and an intergener­
ational perspective. The Report o f  the Consultant Panel on Social 
Security states that
complete equity between generations demands that those diff erent 
generations receive comparable benefit amounts in return for com­
parable contributions. Ultimate equity within a generation exists only 
if workers’ benefits are directly proportional to the amounts of their 
contributions,
Recent pronouncements from Social Security policymakers and 
the Reagan Administration have tended to reinforce the goal of 
social adequacy as an essential component o f the program. Presi­
dent Reagan’s bipartisan National Commission on Social Security 
Reform unanimously agreed that
the Congress, in its deliberations on financing proposals, should not 
alter the fundamental structure of the Social Security program or 
undermine its fundamental principles. The National Commission con­
sidered, but rejected, proposals to make the Social Security program
9. Reports of the 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security, Social Security 
Financing and Benefits, p. 5.
10. Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security to the Congressional Re­
search Service, p. 13.
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a voluntary one, or to transform it into a program under which benefits 
are a product exclusively of the contributions paid, or to convert it 
into a fu lly-funded program, or to change it to a program under which 
benefits are conditioned on the showing of financial need.11
The Economics of Social Security
The Social Security program is currently the largest single pro­
gram in the federal budget. Outlays for Social Security and Med­
icare are projected to comprise approximately 28 percent o f total 
budget outlays for 1987. This is slightly more than the national 
defense outlays, which are estimated to comprise 27.4 percent o f 
the budget.12 Receipts from Social Security taxes are currently the 
second-largest source o f federal tax revenues. For 1987, it is es­
timated that Social Security taxes will account for 39.2 percent o f 
total federal tax revenues. This compares to 42.2 percent for in­
dividual income taxes and 12.5 percent for corporate income 
taxes.13
The magnitude of the Social Security program is impressive in 
absolute terms. To appreciate the growing impact o f the program 
on our economy, however, one only needs to examine the growth 
o f the program during the past twenty-five years. The following 
two sections trace the growth of the Social Security program from 
the perspective o f both the expenditures and the receipts.
The Growth of Social Security Expenditures
The Social Security program began paying benefits in 1940. In 
that year, Social Security outlays accounted for 0.3 percent o f total 
budget outlays. In 1950, amendments were made to the program 
that liberalized eligibility for benefits and extended compulsory 
coverage to most nonfarm self-employed persons. In that year, 
Social Security outlays increased to 1.8 percent o f total budget 
outlays. In 1956, disability benefits were added, and the age of
11. Report of the National Commission on Social Security Reform (Washington, 
D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 2-2.
12. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Special Analysis Budget of the 
United States Government, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1987), p. B-2.
13. Ibid.
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entitlement was reduced to age 62 for women. Outlays increased 
to 7.8 percent of the budget. Medicare was added in 1965, and 
this raised the outlay percentage to 14.8 percent. Automatic wage 
and benefit indexing was introduced in 1972 and modified sub­
stantially in 1977. By 1972, the outlay percentage had grown to 
20.7 percent, and it increased to 25.5 percent in 1977. By 1985, 
this percentage exceeded 28 percent. A comparison of the per­
centage change in outlays in the federal budget fr om 1960 to 1988 
is presented in figure 1.1, which is taken from the Special Analysis 
Budget o f  the United States Government, 1988. The growth in 
domestic transfer payments (much o f which can be attributed to 
Social Security) as a percentage o f the budget is evident from this 
figure.
In addition to its growth in absolute dollars, Social Security 
program spending has also increased significantly in terms o f real 
(indexed) dollars. From 1962 to 1981, Social Security benefits grew 
at a real growth rate o f 8.7 percent. Since 1981, program cuts and 
Social Security reforms have lowered the real growth rate to ap­
proximately 3.4 percent.14
The Growth of Social Security Taxes
The growth of Social Security taxes as a percent o f total federal 
receipts has been dramatic since their imposition in 1937. In 1940, 
the first year o f payments, Social Security taxes actually accounted 
for 27.3 percent o f total tax receipts (by contrast, individual income 
taxes accounted for 13.6 percent o f total tax receipts and corporate 
income taxes accounted for 18.3 percent). Expansion o f the income 
tax system to help pay for World War II raised the individual 
income tax percentage to 45.0 percent in 1944 and the corporate 
income tax percentage to 33.9 percent. This had the effect o f low­
ering the Social Security percentage to 7.9 percent.15 Since that 
time, the individual income tax percentage has remained in the 
range o f 40 to 45 percent o f total tax receipts. Over the same period, 
there has been a gradual decline in the percentage raised by the
14. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Major Themes and Additional Bud­
get Details, FY 1985 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984),
p. 112.
15. U.S. Office o f Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the 
United States Government, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1985), pp. 2.2(1)-2.2(2).
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Figure 1.1
Distribution of Federal Sector Expenditures by Category,
1960-1988
Source: Special Analysis Budget o f the United States Government, 
1988, p. B-3.
corporate income tax and a steady rise in the percentage raised by 
Social Security taxes.
Since 1968, the percentage raised by Social Security taxes has 
exceeded that raised by corporate income taxes such that in 1987 
Social Security taxes will raise more than four times the tax rev­
enues raised through the corporate income tax. This change in the 
percentage of tax dollars raised by each tax revenue source can be 
seen in figure 1.2, which is also taken from the Special Analysis 
Budget o f  the United States Government, 1988.
One consequence o f the increase in the Social Security tax has 
been to increase significantly the size and nature of the tax burden 
on low- and middle-income workers. As reported by the President’s
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Figure 1.2
Distribution of Federal Sector Receipts by Category,
1960-1988
Distribution of Federal Sector Receipts by Category
Percent Percent
1960 64
Fiscal Years
88
Estimate
Source; Special Analysis Budget of the United States Government, 
1988, p. B-6.
National Commission on Social Security Reform, Social Security 
taxes paid by the average worker (including the employer-paid 
portion) have increased 2,011 percent between 1950 and 1980, as 
compared with a 594 percent increase in federal income taxes paid 
and a 490 percent increase in wages.16 The net result, as reported 
in the Special Analysis Budget o f  the United States Government, 
1988, is that
As a result of the rapid rise in social insurance taxes (mainly social
security) and the passage of legislation reducing or eliminating indi-
16. Report of the National Commission on Social Security Reform (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), Statement (7), p.
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vidual incom e taxes for many low- and m oderate-incom e individuals 
and families, millions o f Americans now pay significantly higher social 
insurance taxes than incom e taxes.17
One might assume under a “pay-as-we-go” funding philosophy, 
that whenever Social Security benefits are increased, there would 
be a commensurate increase in Social Security taxes to pay for the 
increased expenditures. Such has generally not been the case, at 
least not until the early 1970s. Benefit increases in the 1950s and 
1960s were not accompanied by tax increases o f the same magni­
tude, Instead, Congress chose to draw down the reserves in the 
trust funds to make up part o f the difference between receipts and 
outlays. Such actions ultimately led to an impending insolvency of 
the retirement trust fund in 1984. The immediate insolvency was 
prevented by allowing inter-fund borrowing from the disability and 
hospital trust funds and by the enactment o f tax increases coupled 
with the deferral o f expenditures in the 1983 Amendments to the 
Social Security Act.
The rise in Social Security taxes, the much publicized near 
insolvency of the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund, and record 
federal budget deficits have combined to focus attention once again 
on the size o f the Social Security program and the premise on 
which it was founded. This last section will discuss short- and long- 
range concerns that have been voiced about the Social Security 
program as it prepares to begin its second 50 years o f existence.
Concerns About the Social Security 
Program in 1987 and Beyond
Despite the changes made in the Social Security program by 
the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act to alleviate the 
imbalance between revenues and expenditures (e.g., acceleration 
of tax increases, expansion of covered employment, increase in the 
retirement age, deferral o f cost o f living adjustments), there still 
exist both short- and long-range concerns about both the financial 
health and the perceived fairness o f the current Social Security 
system. In particular, concerns continue to be expressed about
17. Special Analysis Budget of the United States Government, 1988, pp. B-4, 5.
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(1) the fragility of the financial solvency o f the trust funds in the 
short run, (2) the cost to support the program in the long run, (3) 
the unequal treatment of spouses under the current system, and 
(4) the degree to which a fair return on Social Security payments 
can be guaranteed to all participants in the program. These four 
concerns will be discussed in this section of this report.
The Financial Solvency of the Trust Funds in the Short Run
Beginning in 1976 and continuing through 1983, the disburse­
ments from the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund exceeded the 
income to the fund in each month. The trust fund balance was 
reduced from $39.9 billion at the beginning of 1976 to $9.1 billion 
at the end of 1983. If it were not for a loan o f $17.5 billion from 
the disability and hospital trust funds, the retirement trust fund 
would not have been able to meet its obligations in 1983.
The combination of accelerated tax increases, an improved 
economy, and lower inflation rates has resulted in a much improved 
picture for the OASI trust fund in the near future. According to 
the 1986 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees o f this fund, 
inflows into the fund during fiscal year 1985 exceeded outflows by 
$9.4 billion.18 The report stated that benefits could be paid “for 
many years into the future, on the basis o f all four sets o f economic 
and demographic assumptions.” 19 In the short range (1986 to 1990), 
it is estimated that income to the fund will exceed outflows in each 
year. For the years 1986 through 2010, a surplus varying from 1.01 
to 3.21 percent o f taxable payroll is projected. However, the cur­
rent balance in the trust fund is still precarious. The trustees note 
that the trust fund levels are estimated to remain low through 1987 
and need to be carefully monitored.20 After 1987, it is projected 
that the trust fund’s ability to withstand temporary economic down­
turns will improve steadily.
The optimism over the financial status of the retirement trust 
fund, while generally acknowledged, is not universally shared. A 
recent economic study published by the Committee for Economic 
Development (CED) expresses strong reservations about the va-
18. 1986 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 3.
19. Ibid.
20. 1986 Annual Report, p. 65.
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lidity o f the economic assumptions used in preparing the forecasts 
for the retirement trust fund.21 The concern of the CED is that 
the range o f assumptions used is too narrow in light o f past ex­
perience. In any case, it appears safe to speculate that an economic 
downturn o f the magnitude experienced in 1981 and 1982 would 
once again threaten the financial solvency of the retirement trust 
fund if it occurred in the next several years.
The Financial Solvency of the Trust Funds in the Long Run
The 1986 Annual Report o f the Board o f Trustees o f the re­
tirement trust fund estimates that beginning after the year 2020, 
the trust fund will once again begin experiencing annual deficits 
between inflows and outflows. The average annual deficit under 
the trustees’ “ realistic” assumption (Alternative II-B) for the period 
from 2036 to 2060 is projected to be 2.24 percent o f taxable payroll 
for the retirement trust fund only. Under the “pessimistic” as­
sumptions (Alternative III), this annual deficit could average as 
high as 9.10 percent o f taxable payroll. Translated, this means that 
the combined payroll tax paid by employees and employers would 
have to be increased by 9.10 percentage points to fund the benefit 
payments. When the OASDI cost is combined with the cost to 
support the hospital trust fund, the total payroll tax rate necessary 
to support the Social Security program during the period from 
2036 to 2060 is projected to be almost 24 percent using the “re­
alistic” assumptions and could reach as high as 40 percent under 
the “pessimistic” assumptions. It should be pointed out that the 
“ realistic” assumptions use an inflation rate o f 4.0 percent and an 
unemployment rate o f 6.0 percent, while the “pessimistic” as­
sumptions use an inflation rate o f 5.0 percent and an unemploy­
ment rate o f 7.0 percent. Even using the “ realistic” assumptions, 
a self-employed person would be required to “contribute” one- 
quarter o f his or her net self-employment income to the Social 
Security program to keep it solvent under the current financing 
arrangement.
The projected deficits in the Social Security trust funds over 
the long run are the result o f projected structural changes in de­
mography rather than projected economic performance. In partic-
21. Committee for Economic Development, Social Security: From Crisis to Cri­
sis (New York; Committee for Economic Development, 1984), pp. 9-10.
29
ular, the ratio of beneficiaries to workers is projected to change 
dramatically due to (1) a rapid growth in the aged population (due 
to the retirement of the post-World War II babies), (2) improve­
ments in mortality rates (average life expectancy is at an all-time 
high of 74.6 years), and (3) a significant drop in birth rates (fewer 
workers are being added to the population). While the ratio o f 
workers to beneficiaries was 16.5:1 in 1950, it is projected to decline 
to 1.9:1 in 2030.22 Under a “pay-as-you-go” funding arrangement, 
this means that each retiree’s benefits will be dependent on the 
contributions o f only two workers.
The Treatment of Spouses Under the Present 
Social Security Program
In addition to the demographic changes that threaten the long- 
run financial solvency of the Social Security program, there are 
also demographic changes that threaten the perceived (and actual) 
equity o f the benefit structure. In particular, the 1970s began a 
period of rapid change in the composition o f the U.S. workforce 
and in the divorce rates. When the Social Security program was 
founded in 1935, the divorce rate was minimal and more than 80 
percent o f all households were supported by one working spouse. 
Today both of these statistics have changed dramatically. Over half 
(51 percent in 1982) of all married women are engaged in paid 
employment (49 percent o f the married mothers o f preschool chil­
dren), and approximately half o f all first marriages end in divorce 
(the average length of marriage is currently about 9.5 years).23
The current Social Security dependency rules (see earlier dis­
cussion in this chapter) have not been changed to reflect the socio­
economic changes that have occurred since 1935. As a result, many 
second-wage earners in a marriage discover that they have paid in 
significant amounts of Social Security taxes on their lifetime earn­
ings and still qualify for benefits based on their spouse’s earnings 
record. A one-wage-earner couple could receive identical retire­
ment benefits as the two-wage-earner couple and have paid sig­
nificantly less in Social Security taxes. In addition, should one of
22. 1986 Annual Report, p. 73.
23. Arland Thornton and Deborah Freedman, “The Changing American Family; 
Marriage and Divorce,” Economic Outlook USA (Ann Arbor: University of Mich­
igan, 1984), pp. 39-43.
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the workers in a two-wage-earner family die before reaching re­
tirement, the surviving spouse would receive benefits based on 
the earnings record of only one o f the marriage partners. The 
economic benefit o f the retirement portion o f the Social Security 
contributions of one of the two partners will be lost to the family 
unit, except for a $255 death benefit.
In addition to the bias against the two-wage-earner couple, 
there also exists a bias against the spouse who gives up covered 
employment to raise a family. Under the current provision, a 
spouse must remain married for at least 10 years before he or she 
is entitled to retirement benefits based on the earnings record of 
the other spouse. In light of the fact that the average marriage lasts 
only 9.5 years, it appears safe to assume that an increasing number 
of nonemployed spouses are being left with no earnings record for 
a substantial period o f time and no Social Security credits for the 
time spent supporting the ex-spouse during the marriage. Although 
most of these divorced persons eventually remarry or build up 
work records of their own, the current arrangement is still ineq­
uitable.
O f even more concern to most policymakers is the financial 
condition o f widows who have reached retirement age. A recent 
study undertaken by the Social Security Administration revealed 
that retired widows had a median income that was 78 percent of 
that of retired nonmarried men and 37 percent of that o f retired 
couples. The cause for this discrepancy was not attributed to the 
structure o f the current Social Security program, however. Rather, 
the low economic state o f many widows was more closely related 
to the fact that these persons tended to have few sources o f income 
other than Social Security b e n e f i t s .24 Such a finding reinforces the 
need to more broadly define retirement policy to include private 
savings and pension plans along with Social Security (see chapter 
3 for a broader discussion of national retirement policy).
A solution that has been proposed to mitigate the marriage 
inequities that can occur under the present system is the imple­
mentation o f some form of earnings sharing among spouses. In its 
most basic form, earnings sharing can be defined as a plan in which 
“ the combined earnings of a husband and wife during the period 
o f their marriage shall be divided equally and shared between them
24. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Report on Earnings Shar­
ing Implementation Study (SSA Pub. No. 12-004, January 1985), p. 10.
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for social security benefit purposes.”25 The premise behind the 
earnings sharing concept is that marriage should be viewed as an 
economic partnership in which assets (such as Social Security earn­
ings credits) should be divided equally between the spouses. A 
“pure” earnings sharing plan would credit each spouse with half 
o f the couple’s total covered earnings for each year o f marriage and 
replace the current benefit structure with one in which each spouse 
would have a separate earnings record for benefit computation 
purposes. In its report on earnings sharing, the Social Security 
Administration estimated that about 64 percent o f the male ben­
eficiaries and 37 percent o f the female beneficiaries who would be 
age 62 or older in 2030 would receive reduced benefits under a 
generic earnings sharing plan without any transition plan.26
The crucial issues that must be resolved if an earnings sharing 
concept is to be implemented are: (1) phasing in the plan for current 
workers and (2) determining the extent to which earnings are to 
be shared.27 Under any earnings sharing plan, there would have 
to be safeguards to insure that current workers who have partici­
pated in the system for a substantial number o f years receive ben­
efits that parallel what they would receive under the current law. 
In every case, it would appear that earnings sharing would have 
to be implemented on a prospective basis because o f the near 
impossibility o f reconstructing accurate earnings records for mem­
bers o f the current workforce who have been divorced, remarried, 
etc.
The Actuarial Fairness of the Current 
Social Security Program
The current Social Security benefit structure is weighted to 
provide the low-income worker with a higher retirement income 
replacement rate than the high-income worker. Such a structure 
has been defended on the grounds that higher-income workers 
have additional sources o f retirement income, whereas lower-in- 
come workers are likely to be more heavily dependent on Social 
Security as a means of support in retirement. It also reflects the 
fact that the primary emphasis in the Social Security system is on
25. Report on Earnings Sharing Implementation Study, p. 17.
26. Report on Earnings Sharing Implementation Study, p. 22.
27. Report on Earnings Sharing Implementation Study, chapters IV and V.
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“ social adequacy” (see the earlier discussion on the philosophy of 
Social Security).
As a result o f the current benefit structure, lower-wage earners 
receive a “return” on their tax contributions that is much greater 
than would be justified under a strict actuarial computation. These 
windfall benefits are in reality a form o f wealth transfer payments 
from the higher-wage earner to the lower-wage earner. Wealth 
transfer payments are most often justified as being appropriate in 
the Social Security program because they provide the elderly with 
transfer payments that are devoid o f the stigma attached to direct 
welfare payments.
The use o f the Social Security program to fund transfer pay­
ments means that higher-wage earners must accept a lower return 
on their Social Security contributions. Current retirees at all wage 
levels could, to date, expect to receive retirement benefits in excess 
o f an “actuarially fair” benefit. As the Social Security tax burden 
increases, however, the promise o f receiving an “actuarially fair” 
benefit is less likely to be fulfilled for many future retirees. This 
relationship o f benefits to contributions is explored more fully in 
chapter 2.
28. See, for example, Robert J. Meyers, Social Security (Homewood, IL: Richard
D. Irwin, 1985), pp. 306-308, 462-465, 478-483 and Edmund Outslay and James
E. Wheeler, “Separating the Annuity and Income Transfer Elements o f Social 
Security,” The Accounting Review, October 1982, pp. 716-733.
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An Annuity Analysis of the 
Current Social Security 
Benefit Program
An alternative approach to the present computation o f Social 
Security benefits is to replace the existing stratified (three-tiered) 
benefit formula with a uniform benefit schedule that is based on 
the total contributions o f each individual to the retirement system. 
Total contributions would include both the employee- and em­
ployer-paid contributions plus a real rate o f return. Retirees would 
be given a choice o f the following options at retirement: (1) a joint- 
and-survivor annuity, (2) a single-life annuity, or (3) an annuity 
with a guaranteed refund feature.
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the benefit structure 
of the current Social Security program with the benefits that would 
be payable under an annuity approach. Such a comparison will 
illustrate the extent to which wealth transfers (welfare) exist under 
the current program and provide a point o f reference in evaluating 
the effects of adopting an annuity approach. It should be pointed 
out that this analysis uses the currently scheduled tax rates in the 
computation of the worker’s contribution to the retirement system. 
The appropriate tax rates to impose under an annuity approach 
would be determined by the level o f benefits that is deemed nec­
essary to provide beneficiaries with a determined minimum level 
o f income. The current rates are used in this analysis solely as a 
measure of comparison of the current benefit structure with an 
annuity-based benefit structure.
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Defining an Annuity Approach
The model used to represent the annuity approach is presented 
in exhibit 2.1. The components o f each o f the equations in the 
model and the necessary underlying assumptions are discussed in 
this section. Before this is done, however, an overview o f the 
overall contents and intent o f the model is presented.
The objective o f the model is to compute the annuity returns 
to groups of workers who have paid into Social Security under 
different assumptions about wage levels, family wage-earner com­
positions, working periods, and interest rates. The annuity returns 
computed take into account inflation indexing o f the benefits and 
guaranteed rates o f return, and thus differ from private market 
annuities in that respect.
The first equation (equation 1 in the model) calculates the fund 
amount that would be “credited” to a worker upon retirement at 
age 65 (the Social Security system would presumably still operate 
on a “pay-as-you-go” basis). This credited amount will be depen­
dent upon the level o f the worker s wages (wi) subject to the Social 
Security tax, the rate o f tax (ti), and the compound interest rate 
(rk). Survival probabilities are not included in this formula because 
the focus is on those participants who reach retirement (entitle­
ment) age.
The second two equations in the model (equations 2 and 3) are 
used to compute the cost o f a $1 indexed (price-level-adjusted) 
annuity-due at age 65 for either a single-life annuity (equation 2) 
or a joint-and-two-thirds survivor annuity (equation 3). The joint- 
and-two-thirds survivor annuity is equivalent to the dependent’s 
provisions of the current Social Security program in which spouses 
may jointly receive 150 percent o f the benefit o f the spouse with 
the larger benefit while both are alive, with the survivor receiving 
100 percent o f the benefit after one of the spouses dies.
Equations 2 and 3 are referred to in actuarial science as “com­
mutation functions.” 1 Each of the terms in these equations is in 
standard actuarial notation. Note that survival probabilities (lx) are 
factors in the annuity equations because the annuities are paid over 
the remaining lives o f the beneficiaries, as are Social Security ben­
efits. An assumption about a discounting factor (vx) is also required 
in the computation.
1. Chester W. Jordan, Society of Actuaries’ Textbook on Life Contingencies, 2nd 
ed. (Chicago: The Society of Actuaries, 1967), p. 40.
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Exhibit 2.1
Annuity Computation M odel
(1)
C e =  future value of contributions accumulated to date 
of entitlement of worker 
wi =  worker’s taxed wages in year i 
tai =  tax rate assessed on worker in year i 
tbi =  tax rate assessed on worker’s employer in year i 
s — percentage of employer-paid tax rate shifted to 
the worker
rk = compounding interest rate in year k 
e =  year of entitlement to begin collecting benefits
The initial annuity that can be purchased with C e can be 
defined as either C e/äx or C e/äxy, where
äx
and
=  cost of $1 of a single-life annuity-due =  N x/D 65 (2)
Dx
vx
1x
and
= vx1x
=  discount factor for some interest rate r 
=  survival probability factor for age x
N x =  N x+1 +  D x, or the sum of D x’s from termination 
age (age 99) to entitlement age (age 65)
or
axy =  cost of $1 of a joint-and-two-thirds-survivor
annuity-due =  2/ 3 äx +  2/ 3 äy — 1/3 äxy, where
äx =
äy =
äxy =
single-life annuity-due for a male 
single-life annuity-due for a female 
joint-life annuity-due for male and female, 
defined as N xy/D xy
(3 )
Source: Edmund Outslay and James E. Wheeler, “Separating the Annuity and 
Income Transfer Elements of Social Security,” The Accounting Review, October 
1982, p. 720.
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Once the cost o f $1 of either annuity-due is calculated, the 
annual annuity is computed by dividing the fund available to “pur­
chase” the annuity at age 65 (Ce) by the cost o f purchasing a $1 
annuity-due. This annuity can then be compared with the Social 
Security “annuity” that would be payable under the current law 
given the corresponding wage history for each worker examined. 
Differences between the two computations provide a measurement 
o f the extent to which current benefits exceed (fall short of) ac­
tuarially earned benefits based on lifetime contributions.
The remainder of this section discusses the components o f each 
o f the equations o f the annuity model.
Computing the Future Value of Taxes Paid
Workers o f different wage and family profiles were formed for 
two working lifetime periods: 1942 to 1984 and 1985 to 2027. These 
groups will allow for comparisons between persons who are retiring 
in 1985 and persons who are beginning work in 1985. For each 
time period, three sets o f wage histories were analyzed. These 
wage histories represent workers earning the (1) federal minimum 
wage, (2) average wage subject to Social Security taxation, and (3) 
maximum wage subject to Social Security taxation (the wage and 
contribution base). Two-wage-earner couples were formed using 
the various combinations of maximum, average, and minimum 
wage levels. For years before 1986, the actual wage at each level 
was used in the computation. For years after 1985, the three levels 
were projected using the Economic Assumptions II-B contained 
in the 1985 Annual Report o f the Board of Trustees o f the Old- 
Age and Survivors Trust Funds.2 The Economic Assumptions 
II-B are often referred to as the “ realistic” assumptions in the 
Annual Report (as opposed to the “ optimistic” and “pessimistic” 
assumptions). Under Economic Assumptions II-B, the average 
earnings in covered employment are projected to level off at an 
increase of 5.5 percent per year beginning in the year 2010. The 
real growth in average earnings (nominal growth less the increase 
in the CPI) is assumed to be 1.5 percent.
2. 1985 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1985), p. 28.
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The rate o f tax paid by the worker (as scheduled under current 
law) was restricted to only that portion o f the Social Security tax 
that is designated for funding retirement benefits (i.e., the old-age 
and survivorship portion, hereafter referred to as OASI). As a 
simplifying assumption, the OASI taxes were treated as paid at the 
beginning of the year in one lump sum payment. This assumption 
will slightly overstate the total future value o f the “accumulated” 
payments at age 65.
The amount of contributions credited to the worker was cal­
culated using just the amount paid by the worker and by using the 
combined amount paid by the worker and his or her employer.
Finally, the contributions were compounded using both a 1 
percent and a 3 percent real rate o f return assumption. For each 
year in which the worker paid taxes, the contributions were com­
pounded by an interest rate composed o f the actual or projected 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) rate for that year plus 1 or 3 percent. 
The CPI projections for 1985 and beyond were based on Economic 
Assumptions II-B used in the 1985 Annual Report o f the Board of 
Trustees of the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Funds. Under Eco­
nomic Assumptions II-B, the CPI rate is projected to level off at 
an annual increase of 4 percent by the year 1991. A 1 percent real 
rate o f return would be represented by an interest rate o f 5 percent 
and a 3 percent real rate o f return would be represented by an 
interest rate o f 7 percent.
Computing the Cost of an Annuity-Due
The primary considerations in the computation of the cost o f a 
$1 annuity-due, either single-life or joint-and-two-thirds survivor, 
are the interest factor (vx) and the mortality factor (lx). The interest 
factor used reflected either a 1 percent or a 3 percent real rate of 
return, corresponding to the real rate o f return used to compute 
the “fund” available to purchase the annuity in equation 1 o f the 
model. Because the annuity computed was an inflation-adjusted 
annuity (to make it comparable to the social security benefit), the 
CPI adjustment was omitted from (i.e., the interest rate used 
was either 1 or 3 percent). The resulting annuity is, therefore, 
initially smaller than an annuity that is a level benefit per year. 
Unisex mortality rates were used in making the computations and 
were obtained from the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associ­
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ation (TIAA).3 These rates tend to be slightly above the national 
average because of the characteristics o f TIAA’s annuitants.
The cost of a $1 single-life indexed annuity-due under a 1 per­
cent real rate o f return assumption was computed to be $18.44. 
The cost of a joint-and-two-thirds survivor option under the same 
interest rate assumption was computed to be $19.83. The cost of 
a $1 single-life indexed annuity-due under a 3 percent real rate of 
return assumption was computed to be $15.03, with the corre­
sponding joint-and-two-thirds survivor annuity-due costing $16.00.
A Comparison of Social Security 
Benefits With an Annuity Approach
The focus of the analysis in this chapter is on comparing the 
Social Security benefits workers can expect to receive under the 
current system with benefits computed using the annuity formulas 
just discussed. The obvious difference between the two calculations 
will stem from the fact that under the current system, benefits are 
a function of lifetime wages subject to Social Security taxation while 
the annuity is a function o f lifetime taxes paid.
In this study, the retirement and dependent’s benefits for each 
worker or family unit were computed using the benefit (PIA) com­
putation software program developed and supplied by the Office 
o f the Actuary o f the Social Security Administration.4 This program 
is not the official program used to compute actual benefits, but it 
does compute the benefits to be received under different wage 
levels. As was the case with the annuity computations, the eco­
nomic assumptions needed to project changes in the CPI and the
3. Unisex mortality rates are used in these computations rather than gender 
specific mortality rates to be in conformance with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Com­
pensation Plans V. Norris [103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983)], which mandated the use o f 
unisex mortality rates so as not to discriminate against women.
4. Permission to use the software package developed by the Office of the Ac­
tuaries of the Social Security Administration is acknowledged and greatly appre­
ciated. It should not be construed that the Social Security Administration 
participated in this study, however.
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average wages subject to the Social Security tax were based on the 
1985 Trustees’ Economic Assumptions II-B.
The retirement benefits for the worker were computed under 
the assumption that the worker retired at age 65. For workers in 
the wage period 1985 to 2027 the “normal” retirement age under 
the current law would be age 67. If benefits were elected at age 
65, the benefit amount would be reduced by an actuarial factor o f 
86.67 percent. In this study, the benefits used for comparison were 
not reduced by the actuarial factor. In the case of family units, it 
was assumed the spouses were the same age and applied for ben­
efits at the same time.
To be consistent with the Social Security taxes paid assumption, 
the Social Security benefit was assumed to be paid at the beginning 
of each year in one lump-sum payment (annuity-due) rather than 
as a monthly payment.
Results and Analysis
The results o f the comparisons between the Social Security 
benefit to be received and the corresponding annuity that the tax 
contributions could “purchase” are presented in tables 2.1 through 
2.4. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 portray the results for single-wage earners 
and married couples with one- and two-wage earners o f various 
income levels who began working in 1942 and are retiring in 1985. 
Table 2.1 presents the results under a 1 percent real rate o f return 
assumption and table 2.2 presents the results under a 3 percent 
real rate o f return assumption. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 repeat the same 
comparisons for single and married couple wage earners who began 
working in 1985 and will retire in the year 2028.
Column 1 of each table lists the worker status and wage levels 
of each worker. The second column lists the “ fund” that would be 
credited to the worker(s) upon retirement if the Social Security 
taxes paid were deemed to accumulate at the prescribed real rate 
o f interest. This amount takes into account the Social Security taxes 
paid by both the worker and the worker’s employer. If just the 
worker’s contributions were taken into account, the amount would 
be half o f the listed amount. It must be stressed again that this 
analysis uses the currently scheduled OASI tax rates in making 
this computation.
Column 3 provides the retirement benefit that the workers 
would be entitled to given their respective wage histories. Column
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Notes to the Preceding Tables
1. The wages for married couples are the various combinations of the 
three wage levels computed for single workers (i.e., Min/Min rep­
resents a two wage-earner couple who both earned at the minimum 
wage level).
2. The future value of taxes paid includes both the employer- and em­
ployee-paid amounts.
3. The annuity benefit is computed as a single life for single workers and 
a joint and two-thirds survivor for married workers.
4. The OASI/Annuity benefit ratio is computed for both the combined 
employer and employee contribution and the employee contribution 
alone (in parentheses).
5. The OASI benefit for married retirees is computed using the greater 
of the actual combined benefits or 150% of the benefit of the spouse 
with the greater earnings for purposes of the dependency benefit.
6. Ratios of less than 1.00 (marked with an *) indicate situations in which 
the Social Security benefit is less than the annuity that could be “pur­
chased” with the “fund” of contributions accumulated at the date of 
retirement.
4 then lists the price-level adjusted annuity benefit that could be 
“purchased” with the “fund” from column 2. Finally, the retire­
ment benefit in column 3 is divided by the annuity benefit from 
column 4, with the resulting ratio presented in column 5. The first 
ratio presented is computed using the total amount from column 
2 (the combined taxes paid by the worker and the worker s em­
ployer). The second ratio takes into account only the funds con­
tributed by the worker. This ratio measures the extent to which 
the Social Security benefit exceeds or falls short o f the annuity 
benefit. Ratios in excess o f 1.00 indicate situations in which the 
Social Security benefit contains a transfer welfare payment.
It is apparent from tables 2.1 and 2.2 that workers o f all income 
levels and marital statuses who retired in 1985 expected to receive 
an income transfer payment through the Social Security system 
under either a 1 or 3 percent real rate o f return assumption. As 
one would expect given the skewness in the benefit structure to­
ward low-income wage earners, the transfer element is greatest in 
payments to workers at the minimum wage and to couples in which 
only one wage earner is present (due to the dependency provision).
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Wage earners at the maximum covered wage receive the smallest 
element o f transfer payment as a percentage o f the total payment. 
In nominal dollars, however, the maximum-wage earners receive 
a transfer payment that exceeds the transfer payment received by 
low-wage earners (e.g., the transfer payment made to a single­
wage earner at the minimum wage assuming a 1 percent real rate 
o f return is $3,212.66, whereas the transfer payment made to a 
single-wage earner at the maximum covered wage is $4,717.85). 
It is also apparent from tables 2.1 and 2.2 that the real rate o f 
return assumption has a significant effect on the ratios o f Social 
Security benefit to annuity. Although the Social Security benefit 
is not affected by the assumption changes, the annuity benefit is 
dramatically affected. The ratios under a 3 percent real rate of 
return assumption are 60 to 70 percent o f the ratios under a 1 
percent real rate o f return.
For workers who began work in 1985 (at age 22), the “ returns” 
from the Social Security system are much less generous than those 
received by workers who retired in 1985. Much o f this is due to 
the fact that the Social Security tax burden will be much greater 
on beginning workers during their entire working lives than was 
the case for workers who spent the majority o f their working lives 
in the 1940s through the 1960s. Workers who expect to retire in 
2028 will still receive a transfer payment under a 1 percent real 
rate o f return. However, single-wage earners at the average and 
maximum wage levels, and married two-wage-earner couples who 
have at least one spouse at either the average or maximum wage 
levels can expect to start “subsidizing” the Social Security system 
under a 3 percent real rate o f return. For example, a two-wage- 
earner couple where each spouse earns the maximum covered wage 
can expect to receive a Social Security benefit that is only 66 per­
cent o f what their tax contributions could “purchase” in a price- 
level adjusted annuity. If their employers’ contributions are ig­
nored, there would be a transfer payment to the couple.
It should also be reiterated in this discussion o f benefit ratios 
that the actuarial reduction factor for persons retiring before age 
67 has been ignored for the analysis o f workers retiring in 2028. 
If the actuarial reduction factor o f 86.67 percent was applied to the 
Social Security benefit (as would be the case under current law), 
the OASI/Annuity ratio would decline even further for the 2028 
retirees. For a two-wage-earner married couple, the ratio would 
decline from 66 to 58 percent under a 3 percent real rate o f return 
assumption.
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The bias in the current benefit structure in favor o f single- 
wage-earner families is also evident from the tables. The effect o f 
the dependency provision in the current law can be seen by com­
paring the taxes paid and the benefits received by single-wage- 
earner couples to the corresponding amounts paid and received 
by two-wage-earner couples. A single-wage-earner couple where 
the working spouse earns at the average covered wage can expect 
to receive an OASI benefit o f $100,252.80 when they retire in 
2028. A two-wage-earner couple where both spouses earn at the 
average covered wage can expect to receive an OASI benefit o f 
$133,670.40 (or 33 percent more than the one-wage-earner couple). 
The total Social Security taxes paid by the two-wage-earner couple 
would be twice that paid by the one-wage-earner couple, however.
Other Approaches to the "Money's Worth" Question
There are other ways in which to address the issue as to whether 
the Social Security program provides its participants with a “good 
deal.” In the most frequent case, the “expected future value” o f 
the participant’s tax payments is compared to the “expected present 
value” o f the participant’s Social Security benefits.5 A participant 
is deemed to receive his or her “money’s worth” from Social Se­
curity if the present value of the expected benefits is at least equal 
to the future value of the expected tax payments.
This approach differs from the annuity approach presented in 
this analysis in that mortality considerations are taken into account 
in computing the future value of the tax payments. The annuity 
analysis assumed the worker reached the age of 65. By applying 
mortality rates to the tax payments, one can calculate the expected 
“well-offn ess” of the participant at the beginning o f his or her 
entrance into the system. There is much validity to this approach, 
and readers are advised to investigate those studies as well. The 
annuity approach was chosen for this study because it more clearly
5. See, for examples, Robert J. Meyers, Social Security (Homewood, IL: Richard 
D. Irwin, 1985), pp. 306-308, 462-465, 478-483; Richard V. Burkhauser and 
Jennifer L. Warlick, Disentangling the Annuity from the Redistributive Aspects 
of Social Security (Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion 
Paper No. 562); and Orlo R. Nichols and Richard G. Schreitmueller, Some Com­
parisons of the Value of a Worker’s Social Security Taxes and Benefits (Social 
Security Administration Actuarial Note No. 95, April 1978).
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delineates the “earned” from the “unearned” portions o f the cur­
rent Social Security benefit provisions. It also illustrates the dif­
ferences that could occur in the distribution of retirement benefits 
from the Social Security trust funds if an annuity approach were 
adopted. Although lower-wage earners would receive less in direct 
payments from the Social Security trust funds, it should not be 
assumed that their total payments would be less under an annuity 
plan. If additional payments were deemed necessary to bring these 
persons to a predetermined level o f household income, such pay­
ments could be forthcoming from general revenues, not the Social 
Security trust funds.
Caveats and Implications
Studies such as this, which project wage streams and interest 
rates into the future, are subject to assumptions that may or may 
not prove to be accurate. The assumption o f interest rates was 
shown to have a significant effect on the results in the previous 
study. However, given that the same assumptions are used to 
compute both the annuity and the OASI benefit, comparisons of 
the relative magnitude o f the two amounts do provide a valid frame­
work for evaluating the effects o f adopting an annuity approach. 
To this point, beneficiaries who reach retirement age can expect 
to receive a retirement benefit that is well in excess o f the benefit 
that would be paid if actuarially determined. This phenomenon is 
not expected to continue in the future for all workers. Should 
inflation increase in the future relative to wage growth or should 
taxes have to be increased in the future (as they will under the 
present structure), high- and average-wage earners will receive a 
retirement benefit that is even further diminished when compared 
to an actuarially determined amount.
This study makes no recommendation as to what should be the 
level o f taxes paid or what should be a target retirement figure. 
Comparisons are made using the legislatively scheduled tax rates. 
If an annuity approach were to be adopted, it would be incumbent 
upon policymakers to decide on an appropriate replacement rate 
target for the retirement benefits provided through the Social Se­
curity system. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide an analysis o f the current 
replacement rates that are produced by the Social Security system
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for the same groups of workers that were previously discussed. It 
is apparent from these two tables that lower-wage earners and 
single-wage-earner families have much higher replacement rates 
than higher-wage-earner families. In the extremes, the single- 
wage-earner family at the minimum wage will have 88.5 to 95.5 
percent of their final year’s preretirement wages replaced by their 
Social Security benefits. On the other hand, the single maximum- 
wage earner will have only 22.8 to 27.5 percent o f his or her final 
year’s preretirement wage replaced by the Social Security benefit. 
This again reflects the fact that the benefit structure is heavily 
weighted toward the lower-wage earner.
Regardless o f whether benefits were to be lowered, it will be 
important to educate workers on the role o f the Social Security 
program in the total retirement scheme (along with private savings 
and employer-provided pensions). The next chapter puts the cur­
rent relationship o f Social Security to the other forms o f retirement 
income in perspective.
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Social Security and Its Role in 
a National Retirement 
Income Policy
The "Three-legged Stool"
The components o f retirement income policy in the United 
States have often been referred to as comprising a “ three-legged 
stool.” The three legs o f this stool consist o f government payments 
(most notably Social Security), employee pension plans, and private 
savings. Occasionally, a fourth leg consisting of earned income 
(wages) is added to the stool.
Each o f these components o f retirement income is important 
to consider in the formulation o f a retirement income policy. Fre­
quently, the source and amount of income from one component 
will have an effect on the amount o f income received from another 
component (e.g., earned income may reduce the amount o f Social 
Security benefits received under the retirement test, or the amount 
of Social Security benefit received may reduce the amount o f pen­
sion benefit received if the plan is integrated with Social Security). 
Government policies toward the components o f retirement income 
often fail to take into consideration the impact o f legislation on the 
other components o f retirement income. In addition, tax policies 
toward each component are inconsistent with each other. This 
chapter briefly describes the role o f each component o f retirement 
income, especially with regard to its relationship to the Social 
Security system. Special emphasis is given to the tax policies that 
aff ect each component and how they might be made more con­
sistent.
53
3
Social Security
The Social Security Program was signed into law in 1935 by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The call for a national income 
security program was given a sense o f urgency due to the economic 
catastrophe that befell millions o f Americans in the Great Depres­
sion. As originally envisioned, Social Security was designed to pro­
vide a basic floor of protection for workers who suffered a loss o f 
wage income due to death, disability, or retirement. Subsequent 
to its enactment, and prior to the payment o f any benefits, the 
Social Security program was modified to include the spouses and 
dependents o f workers in its coverage. 1 Since its implementation, 
the program has been modified many times, with the most frequent 
changes being to liberalize benefits and expand the classes o f work­
ers covered by the system. Today, more than 90 percent o f the 
working population is subject to Social Security taxation.
Employee Pension Plans
The first noncontributory company-provided pension plan was 
established in the United States by the American Express Company 
in 1875.2 However, the growth in employee pension plans did not 
become significant until the 1940s and 1950s. This period after 
World War II saw an increase in corporate profits and a significant 
increase in corporate tax rates, thus creating incentives for com­
panies to “shelter” some of their profits by investing in company 
pension plans. In addition, the adequacy o f Social Security benefits 
declined during this period and organized labor exerted pressure 
on companies to include an employee pension plan as part o f their 
fringe benefit packages.3 Finally, companies began to view pension 
plans as one part o f a broader social responsibility to their em­
ployees.4
1. See Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1979) for a more detailed discussion of the history of 
the Social Security program.
2. William C. Greenough and Francis P. King, Pension Plans and Public Policy 
(New York; Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 27.
3. Alicia Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 12-13.
4. President’s Commission on Pension Policy, Coming of Age: Toward a National 
Income Policy (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 12.
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Employee pension plans in the United States increased from 
approximately 15 percent o f the nonagricultural workforce in 1940 
to approximately 41 percent in 1960. Since 1960, however, the 
participation level has grown at a much slower rate so that, by 
1983, approximately 48.5 percent o f the nonagricultural workforce 
was covered by a plan.5 There are those who claim that such figures 
are significantly understated because they include many young 
people who have few years in the workforce and part-timers or 
low-paid workers in small businesses.6 These persons contend that 
the more realistic figure to use approaches 70 percent o f the full­
time American workers age 25 and older. Statistics provided in 
table 3.1 by the Joint Committee on Taxation tend to support that 
argument. According to the table, the percentage o f workers who 
are covered by employer-provided pension plans exceeds 75 per­
cent for workers earning $20,000 and above. For workers earning 
less than $5,000, the percentage drops to 8.8 percent.
In the previous decade there has been significant government 
legislation of pension plans. Beginning with the Employee Retire­
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) o f 1974 and continuing through 
the Retirement Equity Act o f 1984, the government has attempted 
to safeguard the rights o f employees from discriminatory plans that 
would favor higher-paid employees. Such safeguards have often 
been attained with a high price o f complexity, however.
Private Savings
Tax incentives to encourage private savings through the use of 
tax deferred savings accounts (i.e., Individual Retirement Ac­
counts, or IRAs) were first introduced in ERISA in 1974. These 
savings accounts were available only to persons who were not cov­
ered by an employer-provided pension plan. In the Economic Re­
covery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, these plans were extended to all 
employees, regardless o f whether they were covered by an em­
ployer-provided plan. In addition, the amount that could be shel­
tered from current taxation was expanded, as was the amount that 
could be invested in the retirement account o f a spouse who had 
no earned income for the year. As one might expect, the greatest
5. Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions and Deferred 
Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 6.
6. President’s Commission on Pension Policy, p. 63.
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Table 3.1
Distribution o f Total Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Workers 
With Employer Pension Plans, 1983
Wage and Salary Class
Total Wage 
and Salary 
Workers 
(000s)
Workers With Employer- 
Provided Pension Plan
Number
(000s)
%
Workers
Less than $5,000 17,766 1,568 8.8
$ 5 ,000 -$1 0 ,00 0 16,961 4,908 28.9
$10 ,000 -$ 20 ,0 00 29,926 17,405 58.2
$20 ,000-$ 30 ,0 00 16,103 12,216 75.9
$30 ,000 -$ 50 ,0 00 8,544 6,672 78.1
Over $50,000 2,088 1,529 73.2
Total 91,388 44,298 48.5
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions 
and Deferred Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 6.
participation rates in IRAs come from middle- and upper-income 
taxpayers. For 1983, over 66 percent o f the IRA contributions were 
made by taxpayers with adjusted gross income over $30,000.7 Ap­
proximately 10.4 million taxpayers with adjusted gross income of 
under $50,000 made a contribution to an IRA in 1983.8 A more 
complete description o f the contributions made to IRAs by tax­
payers o f various income classes is contained in table 3.2, taken 
from the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Earned Income
As workers have begun to retire at earlier ages, the size and 
importance o f earned income as a source o f income for the aged 
has declined. One cause of this has been the trend toward early 
retirement by today’s workers. In a recent study published by the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO), it was estimated that ap­
proximately 50 percent o f the workers collecting a pension in 1983
7. Joint Committee on Taxation, p. 12.
8. Joint Committee on Taxation, p. 13.
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Table 3.2
Number o f Returns and Amount o f Payment to IRAs 
Distributed by Adjusted Gross Income Class, 1983
Returns Amount o f Payment
Adjusted
Gross
Income
Class
($000s)
No. of 
Eligi­
ble 
Re­
turns* 
(000s)
No. of 
Re­
turns 
(000s)
As a 
%  of 
Eligi­
ble 
Re­
turns 
(%)
Distri­
bution
(%)
Total
Amount
Distri­
bution
(%)
Aver­
age
Amount
($)
Less than 10 27,992 645 2.30 4.70 1,024 3.17 1,588
10-20 21,297 2,010 9.44 14.65 3,648 11.28 1,815
20-30 14,781 2,945 19.92 21.46 6,028 18.63 2,047
30-40 9,814 2,860 29.14 20.84 6,804 21.03 2,379
40-50 4,778 2,140 44.79 15.60 5,638 17.43 2,635
50-100 3,979 2,558 64.29 18.64 7,536 23.30 2,946
100-200 523 431 82.41 3.14 1,292 3.99 2,998
200 or more 164 130 79.27 .95 377 1.17 2,900
Total 83,326 13,721 16.47 100.00 32,348 100.00 2,358
*Eligible returns are returns with wage and salary income.
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions 
and Deferred Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 8.
were age 62 or younger.9 By age 65, this percentage had increased 
to 60 percent. Contributing factors to this trend toward early re­
tirement must undoubtedly include the increase in benefits pro­
vided by the Social Security program starting in the 1970s, coupled 
with the built-in disincentives that the program has against earning 
wages while collecting such benefits (i.e., the retirement test dis­
cussed in detail in chapter 1).
9. General Accounting Office, Retirement Before Age 65 Is a Growing Trend In 
The Private Sector (GAO/HRD-85-81) July 15, 1985, p. 4.
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The Role of Each Component of 
Retirement Income
One of the difficult issues that must be resolved in the debate 
over a national income policy is the role o f each component o f 
retirement income in providing economic security to the elderly. 
The sources o f income for taxpayers who were age 65 and older in 
1983 are detailed in table 3.3. As one might expect, Social Security 
benefits comprise the single largest source o f income to all tax­
payers who are age 65 and older. The percentage of total income 
that Social Security provides decreases as income increases. For 
taxpayers with less than $10,000 o f adjusted gross income, Social 
Security provided 55 percent o f the total amount. For taxpayers 
in the $50,000 to $75,000 range, Social Security provided only 9 
percent o f the total amount. It should be pointed out that over 
two-thirds o f the taxpayers examined in table 3.3 had total adjusted 
incomes of less than $10,000. The heavy reliance on Social Security 
benefits is particularly acute among elderly unmarried women. The 
Social Security Administration reports that in 1982, 20 percent o f 
unmarried beneficiary women age 65 and over received 100 per­
cent o f their income from Social Security.10 This compares to 17 
percent for unmarried beneficiary men and 9 percent o f beneficiary 
married couples.
Although Social Security was intended to provide a floor o f 
basic protection when it was enacted in 1935, it is obvious that 
many retirees view Social Security as their predominant, and fre­
quently their sole, means of retirement support. Despite the sig­
nificant increases in Social Security benefits in the past twenty 
years, a common complaint often registered by beneficiaries about 
Social Security is that it does not provide enough money to live 
on. If Social Security is to serve as a floor o f basic protection, then 
it becomes important to encourage and strengthen the other legs 
o f the retirement stool, employer-provided pensions and individual 
savings.
While individual savings decisions often reflect an individual’s 
propensity to consume goods and services now or in the future, 
the role o f employer-provided pensions is often viewed as a nec­
essary supplement to Social Security to provide retirees with a
10. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Report on Earnings Shar­
ing Implementation Study (SSA Pub. No. 12-004, January, 1985), p. 10.
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retirement level that is somewhat better than a subsistence level. 
In many cases, however, employer-provided pension plans are 
integrated with Social Security such that lower-income employees 
receive a decreased amount of pension relative to higher-income 
persons because the Social Security benefit structure is weighted 
toward the low-wage earner. In the most frequent type o f pension 
plan (integration using the “offset approach”), a portion o f the em­
ployee’s Social Security benefit reduces the benefits payable under 
the pension plan.11 Rather than enhance the Social Security benefit 
received by all employees, such integration plans tend to favor 
those higher-income employees whose replacement income rate 
from Social Security is lower.
Included in the debate over the roles o f the sources o f retire­
ment income is the level at which preretirement income should 
be replaced. Munnell estimates that retirees require 50 to 80 per­
cent o f their preretirement earnings to maintain their living stand­
ards.12 This reduction in income requirements is due to a decrease 
in tax burden and a decrease in work-related expenses. Some pol­
icymakers, most notably the President’s Commission on Pension 
Policy in 1981, have advocated a goal o f maintaining the retiree’s 
preretirement standard o f living during retirement.13 Others, such 
as Munnell, argue that such a goal is not feasible.14
Regardless o f the replacement level chosen as a target, there 
still exists the question as to whether employer-provided pension 
plans should be required o f all employers. The President’s Com­
mission on Pension Policy recommended the establishment o f a 
Minimum Universal Pension System (MUPS). Under this program, 
a minimum pension plan would be required to be established for 
all workers over the age o f 25, with one year o f service, and 1,000 
hours o f employment with their employer. The contribution to the 
pension plan was recommended to be 3 percent o f total payroll. 
Vesting o f benefits would be immediate. Small businesses would 
be able to take a tax credit o f 46 percent o f their contribution to 
a MUPS, up to a limit o f 3 percent o f payroll.15
11. General Accounting Office, Features O f Nonfederal Retirement Programs 
(GAO/OCG-84-2), June 26, 1984, p. 5, and Joint Committee on Taxation, pp. 
60-64.
12. Munnell, p. 23.
13. President’s Commission on Pension Policy, p. C -4 .
14. Munnell, p. 27.
15. President’s Commission on Pension Policy, pp. 42-43.
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Differences in the Tax Treatment of 
Each Component of Retirement Income
The major tax incentive attached to employer-provided pension 
plans and IRAs is the opportunity to deduct the amount of the 
contribution to the plan from the current year’s taxable income 
and to allow the income earned by the contribution pool to ac­
cumulate tax-free over the life o f the investment. When income 
and capital is later withdrawn from the pool, the amount is fully 
taxable. However, it is quite likely that the recipient’s marginal 
tax rates at that time will be much lower than those that would 
have been imposed on the contribution in the year it was contrib­
uted. Penalties exist to discourage, or at least remove the tax ad­
vantages from, premature withdrawals from these plans.
During most o f Social Security’s existence, the major tax ad­
vantage to the participants was the fact that the entire Social Se­
curity retirement benefit was excluded from income taxation upon 
receipt. Beginning in 1984, up to one-half o f the benefit could be 
subject to taxation. Employers are entitled to deduct from their 
taxable incomes the entire amount of the contribution paid on 
behalf o f their employees. Employees, however, are not permitted 
to deduct any o f their contributions to the Social Security system. 
This nondeductibility o f Social Security taxes paid by employees 
results in a potentially costly form of double taxation. Wages are 
subject to the payroll tax, which is in turn subject to the federal 
income tax. This tax on a tax can be very costly to higher income 
wage earners. For example, for a person at the 50 percent marginal 
tax rate who is paying the maximum Social Security amount for 
1985 ($2,791.80), this second tax amounts to $1,395.90.
The Need for a More Consistent 
National Retirement Policy
Future efforts to legislate changes in the tax or other treatment 
of a source o f retirement income should not be done in isolation. 
Policymakers need to consider the effects such legislation is likely 
to have on the other components o f retirement income and on the 
behaviors o f both workers and retirees. Social Security has proven
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to be a much needed program for the elderly, the disabled, and 
the dependents o f deceased workers. The program should be sup­
ported and maintained for all workers and their families. However, 
it is becoming increasingly obvious that demographic changes 
threaten to undermine the stability o f the program in the not-too- 
distant future. The tax rates that will be necessary to support the 
program at its current levels will simply be too high for workers 
to pay. In light o f this fact, it becomes incumbent on government 
to encourage more private sector initiatives to employers and work­
ers to provide alternative sources o f retirement income. Workers 
must be educated that Social Security will provide only a basic 
floor o f protection upon retirement, not an amount that will enable 
the beneficiary to maintain a preretirement life-style. The ultimate 
level o f retirement income is a decision that each individual has 
to make.
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Appendix
Computing the Primary 
Insurance Amount Using the 
Wage-Indexed Method
The calculation o f the primary insurance amount (PIA) using 
the wage-indexed method will be illustrated in this appendix. The 
wage-indexed method was introduced in the 1977 Amendments to 
the Social Security Act and applies to beneficiaries reaching age 
62 after 1978. Under this method, a worker s past wages are ad­
justed for changes in the average wage subject to Social Security 
taxation to restate the wages in more current terms.
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings 
(AIME)
The first step in the computation is to determine a worker’s 
average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The AIME is computed 
in the following manner:
1. The worker’s actual annual covered wages are listed for years 
beginning after 1950 or after age 21, whichever is later.
2. The actual wages for the computation years up to and including 
the second year before the year in which the worker attains age 
62, dies or becomes disabled (whichever is earlier) are indexed 
by multiplying the actual wage times the following ratio:
Average covered annual wage in the second year prior to 
age 62, death or disability 
Average covered annual wage in the year indexed
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3. Covered wages not indexed are included at their actual 
amounts.
4. The computation period consists o f the years beginning after 
age 21 or 1950 (whichever is later) and extending up to the year 
in which the worker becomes 62, dies, or becomes disabled. 
The five years o f lowest (or no) indexed earnings are excluded, 
and years o f earnings after age 61 may be substituted for years 
o f lower indexed earnings included in the computation period.
5. The AIME is then calculated by dividing the total indexed 
annual earnings in the computation period by the number o f 
months in the computation period.
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)
Once the worker’s AIME is computed, the PIA is computed by 
applying three separate percentages to increments o f the AIME. 
The dollar amounts o f AIME at which the percentage changes are 
called “bend points.” The percentage rates are 90, 32, and 15 
percent. The bend points for 1985 are $230 and $1,691. The PIA 
also is increased by the changes in the CPI that occur in the years 
beginning with age 62 and continuing through the last year worked.
Example
An example will be used to illustrate the operation o f each o f 
these computations. The PIA calculation will be made for a worker 
earning at the maximum covered wage who was bom  on February 
1, 1920, and retires on January 1, 1985. The worker is assumed to 
begin work on January 1, 1942, and works through the end o f 1984.
Table A .1 lists the worker’s wages subject to Social Security 
taxation from 1942 through 1984. Table A.2 presents the calculation 
o f the worker’s AIME. Notice that only the wages earned after 
1950 enter the calculation. The average covered wage for 1980 (the 
second year before the worker turns 62) was $12,513.46. This factor 
is used to index the actual wages earned through 1980. The com­
putation period extends from 1951 to 1981. The five lowest indexed
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Table A .1
Maximum Covered Wages for Worker, 1942—1984
Year Earnings
1942 3,000 .00
1943 3,000.00
1944 3,000.00
1945 3,000.00
1946 3,000.00
1947 3,000 .00
1948 3,000 .00
1949 3,000.00
1950 3,000.00
1951 3,600.00
1952 3,600.00
1953 3,600.00
1954 3,600 .00
1955 4,200 .00
1956 4,200 .00
1957 4,200 .00
1958 4,200 .00
1959 4,800 .00
1960 4,800 .00
1961 4,800 .00
1962 4,800 .00
1963 4,800 .00
1964 4,800 .00
1965 4 ,800 .00
1966 6,600.00
1967 6,600.00
1968 7,800.00
1969 7,800.00
1970 7,800.00
1971 7,800.00
1972 9,000.00
1973 10,800.00
1974 13,200.00
1975 14,100.00
1976 15,300.00
1977 16,500.00
1978 17,700.00
1979 22,900.00
1980 25,900.00
1981 29,700.00
1982 32,400.00
1983 35,700.00
1984 37,800.00
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Table A.2
Computation o f AIME for Maximum Wage Worker, 1942-1984 
Wage-Indexed Formula (1977 Act)
Year Earnings
Earnings
$12,513.46
Indexed
Earnings
High N
Years
1951 3,600.00 45,048,460.00 16,093.56 16,093.56
1952 3,600.00 45,048,460.00 15,150.89 15,150.89
1953 3,600.00 45,048,460.00 14,349.20
1954 3,600.00 45,048,460.00 14,275.54
1955 4,200.00 52,556,530.00 15,919.28 15,919.28
1956 4,200.00 52,556,530.00 14,878.59 14,878.59
1957 4,200.00 52,556,530.00 14,431.79
1958 4,200.00 52,556,530.00 14,305.77
1959 4,800.00 60,064,610.00 15,577.73 15,577.73
1960 4,800.00 60,064,610.00 14,989.47 14,989.47
1961 4,800.00 60,064,610.00 14,697.37 14,697.37
1962 4,800.00 60,064,610.00 13,996.51
1963 4,800.00 60,064,610.00 13,661.48
1964 4,800.00 60,064,610.00 13,125.09
1965 4,800.00 60,064,610.00 12,892.94
1966 6,600.00 82,588,840.00 16,723.94 16,723.94
1967 6,600.00 82,588,840.00 15,841.52 15,841.52
1968 7,800.00 97,604,990.00 17,517.80 17,517.80
1969 7,800.00 97,604,990.00 16,560.73 16,560.73
1970 7,800.00 97,604,990.00 15,777.76 15,777.76
1971 7,800.00 97,604,990.00 15,022.90 15,022.90
1972 9,000.00 112,621,200.00 15,786.98 15,786.98
1973 10,800.00 135,145,400.00 17,828.83 17,828.83
1974 13,200.00 165,177,700.00 20,568.13 20,568.13
1975 14,100.00 176,439,800.00 20,442.76 20,442.76
1976 15,300.00 191,455,900.00 20,750.70 20,750.70
1977 16,500.00 206,472,100.00 21,112.88 21,112.88
1978 17,700.00 221,488,300.00 20,982.15 20,982.15
1979 22,900.00 286,558,300.00 24,962.69 24,962.69
1980 25,900.00 324,098,600.00 25,900.00 25,900.00
1981 29,700.00 29,700.00 29,700.00
1982 32,400.00 32,400.00 32,400.00
1983 35,700.00 35,700.00 35,700.00
1984 37,800.00 37,800.00 37,800.00
6 6
wages in the period are eliminated, and the three actual wages 
earned in 1982, 1983, and 1984 are substituted for three indexed 
years because they are higher amounts. This results in eight years 
o f indexed earnings being discarded.
The total annual indexed wages for the remaining twenty-six 
years is $528,686.70. This amount is divided by 312 months (26 
X  12), resulting in an AIME o f $1,694. The PIA is then computed 
as follows:
90% X $ 230 = 207 plus 
32% X 1,461 = 467.52 plus 
15% X 3 = 0.45
for a total o f $674.97. This amount is increased by the CPI increases 
for 1982 (7.4 percent), 1983 (3.5 percent), and 1984 (3.5 percent) 
for a total amount o f $776.55. This is rounded down to $776.50.
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